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Tough love is better for Athens in the long term
Both by chance and design，the emergency policy erected by the European Central Bank to tackle the financial crisis has，so far，played out quite beautifully.By introducing a limited package of measures aimed at flooding the banking system with easily accessible and cheap liquidity，the ECB last year restored some sense of normality to the eurozone’s financial markets.
As 2009 wore on，the liquidity crunch faded and risk premiums in the money markets dropped steadily. Banks used the liquidity provided by the ECB to fund profitable ①carry trades on corporate and government bonds，prompting a massive compression of spreads in credit and sovereign debt markets. As the financial sector healed and recovery gained traction，the need for a timely ②monetary policy exit became apparent. Aware of the perils of procrastination，last December the ECB announced the ③withdrawal of some liquidity measures.
Then，along came the Greek fiscal crisis with the potential of unwinding the progress already achieved. Rather than bow to pressure and delay the exit，the ECB rejected the notion that monetary policy should accommodate member states’ fiscal troubles. Implicitly， the ECB regarded the Greek affair not as another exogenous shock meriting further policy stimulus，but as a demonstration of the dangers of excessive liquidity. This explains why the ECB’s commitment to an exit did not wane as investors’unease spread from Greece to elsewhere in Europe.
Could this posture be construed as stubbornness born out of a rigid fidelity to an ④inflation-fighting mandate？Not really. A timely exit will prompt a more resolute fiscal consolidation where it is most needed. Here is how.
Exiting would make ECB funding harder to get and dearer. Banks would scale down carry trades on sovereign bonds，thereby removing the subsidy to public debt imparted by abundant liquidity. This would hurt primarily the government paper of the most indebted countries，whose higher yields made them the main beneficiaries of carry trades. The resulting higher funding cost would encourage fiscal rectitude for the long haul.
As recent developments attest，no eurozone member will be allowed to default，given the catastrophic consequences that could ensue. The risks include contagion to other vulnerable countries and a eurozone implosion owing to heavy exposure of European banks to peripheral debt：according to the Bank for International Settlements，about 90 per cent of the foreign debt–corporate and sovereign–of Greece，Portugal and Spain is held by other European countries‘banks，mainly German and French.However inevitable，the eurozone’s implicit bail-out guarantee generates moral hazard in the fiscal sphere;something the ECB should fight strenuously–if need be–by rushing its exit strategy.
Aside from fostering fiscal soundness，an exit will help money markets normalise.One pernicious side effect of the ECB’s policy was to get banks addicted to easy central bank money. Consequently，demand for interbank liquidity was artificially subdued and market interest rates sank to levels that discouraged the supply of funds，especially in longer maturities. But as the exit unfolds，demand for market funds automatically increases，rates rise and the yield curve steepens. That stimulates money markets–indispensable for kick-starting bank lending to businesses and households and for sustaining economic recovery.
The ⑤liquidity squeeze has withered，and so should the policy package assembled to address it. Yet an exit might not be achievable in full; due to a devilish detail. Amid the emergency measures，the ECB relaxed the collateral rules for the liquidity-providing operations，but committed to reinstate the original criteria in 2011. By then，as things stand，the eligibility of the Greek bonds will be dependent on Moody’s maintaining its appraisal of Greece，since the other credit agencies’ratings are too low to comply with the original collateral rules.
If Moody’s downgrades Greece，its bonds cease to be eligible for ECB refinancing. That could spark a sell-off of Greek debt，with systemic implications akin to a default. If push came to shove，the ECB would probably maintain the exceptional collateral regime. The credibility of the ECB’s exit strategy is，thus，hostage to Moody’s mood. Hopefully，by 2011，acute anxiety about Greek fiscal sustainability will have abated;perhaps，partly due to the ECB’s tough love.
譯文梗概：
退出策略：歐洲央行不動(dòng)搖
歐洲央行(ECB)為應(yīng)對(duì)金融危機(jī)出臺(tái)的應(yīng)急政策，迄今收效良好，通過(guò)這些政策，歐元區(qū)金融市場(chǎng)在某種意義上恢復(fù)了常態(tài)。為此，歐洲央行于去年12月宣布撤回部分流動(dòng)性措施。
但希臘財(cái)政危機(jī)爆發(fā)，可能使業(yè)已取得的成就一筆勾銷(xiāo)。不過(guò)，歐洲央行沒(méi)有屈從于壓力，它不想推遲執(zhí)行退出策略，因而拒絕接受貨幣政策應(yīng)根據(jù)成員國(guó)財(cái)政困境進(jìn)行調(diào)整的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。歐洲央行的態(tài)度表明，在它看來(lái)，希臘事件并非又是一場(chǎng)外生沖擊，值得歐洲央行給予進(jìn)一步政策刺激，反而證明了流動(dòng)性過(guò)剩的巨大危害。這一點(diǎn)可以解釋?zhuān)瑸槭裁醇词乖谕顿Y者不安的情緒從希臘蔓延到歐洲其它地方之時(shí)，歐洲央行對(duì)退出計(jì)劃的承諾也未見(jiàn)減弱。
這一姿態(tài)可否理解為由于一味忠誠(chéng)于抗通脹使命而產(chǎn)生的固執(zhí)？不見(jiàn)得。及時(shí)退出可以幫助最需要的地區(qū)更堅(jiān)決地鞏固財(cái)政狀況。
如果穆迪調(diào)低對(duì)希臘的評(píng)級(jí)，該國(guó)的債券將不再有資格獲得歐洲央行的再融資。這可能引發(fā)一輪針對(duì)希臘債券的拋售風(fēng)潮，其系統(tǒng)性影響不亞于違約。如果到了迫不得已的地步，歐洲央行可能會(huì)維持目前的非常規(guī)擔(dān)保機(jī)制。因此，歐洲央行退出策略是否可行，還要看穆迪的意愿如何。希望到了2011年，對(duì)希臘財(cái)政可持續(xù)性的深切擔(dān)憂(yōu)將有所緩解——倘若如此，或許在一定程度上要?dú)w功于歐洲央行的“嚴(yán)是愛(ài)”。
(文章來(lái)源：FT中文網(wǎng))
點(diǎn)評(píng)：
①、carry trades，財(cái)經(jīng)術(shù)語(yǔ)，可簡(jiǎn)單地理解為以下投資方式：借入利率較低的某種貨幣，投資于利率或預(yù)期收益率較高的金融資產(chǎn)，可籠統(tǒng)譯為“套利交易”或“利差交易”。
②、monetary policy，貨幣政策，the decisions a monetary authority makes to manages the money supply。
③、withdrawal，意為收回，撤退或者退回，在文中指歐洲央行宣布一些回收流動(dòng)性的措施。
④、inflation-fighting，可譯為抑制通貨膨脹，inflation為通貨膨脹，指物價(jià)普遍上升，如果工資沒(méi)有相應(yīng)增長(zhǎng)，則意味著居民購(gòu)買(mǎi)力下降。
⑤、liquidity squeeze，流動(dòng)性短缺或頭寸緊張。 |